This paper derives a general sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness in continuous games using a variant of the contraction mapping theorem applied to mappings from a subset of the real line on to itself. We first prove this contraction mapping variant, and then show how the existence of a unique equilibrium in the general game can be shown by proving the existence of a unique equilibrium in an iterative sequence of games involving such mappings. Finally, we show how a general condition for this to occur is that a matrix derived from the Jacobian matrix of best-response functions has positive leading principal minors, and how this condition generalises some existing uniqueness theorems for particular games. In particular, we show how the same conditions used in those theorems to show uniqueness, also guarantee existence in games with unbounded strategy spaces.
Introduction .
Many oligopoly models fall into the class of continuous games in which each player chooses a strategy from a connected subset of the real line. For example, in Cournot models each firm chooses a quantity to produce, in product differentiation models firms typically choose a price, and so on.
Conditional on showing existence, there are a number of conditions that have been found for particular subsets of this general class of models, which can be used to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium.
1 Generally, these involve a tradeoff between generality and ease of application. For instance, the contraction mapping theorem offers a general sufficient condition for uniqueness, but for it to be useable one needs to show that the particular mapping for which a fixed point defines an equilibrium constitutes a contraction mapping, a task that is not always straightforward. At the opposite end of the generality/usability continuum, are uniqueness conditions that are specific to particular applications. For instance, conditions for a unique equilibrium in the Cournot quantity-setting oligopoly model have been derived by Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) , Gaudet and Salant (1991) , and Long and Soubeyran (2000) .
Between these two extremes, there are a number of general uniqueness conditions that can be expressed in terms of the signs of the principal minors of a matrix derived from the Jacobian matrix of best-response functions. These include results derived from the Gale and Nikaido (1965) theorem on univalent mappings, and results making use of the Poincaré-Hopf index theorem. (See, for example, Simsek et al., 2007.) A limitation of these uniqueness results, however, is that they depend on a prior demonstration of existence, and that, to the extent that existence is proved by use of the Brouwer or Kakutani fixed-point theorems, this implies a requirement that the strategy space be bounded.
For this reason, it is desirable to find easy-to-apply conditions under which the contraction-mapping theorem can be used to show uniqueness, since the contraction mapping theorem provides a quite general condition for there to be a unique fixed point, with the added benefit that it guarantees existence without the requirements that the space being mapped onto itself be convex or bounded.
In this paper, we derive a variant of the contraction mapping theorem and present an approach in which this variant is applied iteratively to generate a new fixed-point theorem, which, like the contraction mapping theorem, implies both existence and uniqueness without the requirement that the strategy space be bounded. The conditions for this theorem can, like the univalence and indextheorem results referred to above, be expressed in terms of this signs of the principal minors of a matrix derived from the Jacobian matrix of best-response functions.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, in the case where the strategy-space is bounded, the theorem derived in this paper applies to some situations not covered by the P-matrix condition derived from the Gale-Nikkaido theorem or index theory; second, and most important, by showing existence in cases where the strategy space is unbounded, it extends a number of existing uniqueness results to the unbounded case; and third, the derivation does not rely on concepts from differential topology, and so is perhaps more accessible than those derived from index theory.
In the next section, we present the contraction mapping theorem and a related, less-restrictive theorem for the special case of a mapping from a subset of the real line onto itself. Section 3 lays out the general problem. Section 4 shows how an equilibrium in the general game can be defined in terms of a sequence of contraction mappings involving mappings; Section 5 then shows how the existence and uniqueness condition derived iteratively in this way can be represented in terms of the slopes of the best-response functions of each player. Section 6 describes how this general condition encompasses and generalises many existing results. Section 7 provides two examples of games in which these generalisations are needed to demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium. Section 8 concludes.
The Contraction Mapping Theorem and a Related Result.

A. The Contraction Mapping Theorem in Euclidean Space.
Typically in oligopoly models, the existence of an equilibrium is proved by showing the existence of a fixed point in a mapping from a subset of Euclidean space onto itself. Let be a subset of and let be a function mapping onto itself. In this context, the definition of a contraction mapping and the contraction mapping theorem are as follows:
If there exists (0, 1) β ∈ and a norm x such that
then f is a contraction mapping.
Theorem 1 (The Contraction Mapping Theorem):
If is a closed subset of and f is a contraction mapping, then X n R a) (existence and uniqueness) there exists a unique fixed point such that
The contraction mapping theorem has three advantages over the Brouwer or Kakutani fixed-point theorems if a contraction mapping can be shown to exist: First, and most importantly, it shows uniqueness as well as existence; second, it does not require that the set be bounded; and third, it has the convergence property.
X
If we only require existence and uniqueness and not convergence, we can, in principle, relax Condition (1). We do this below for the case of mappings.
1 1 -to-R R
B. The Contraction Mapping Theorem in
Space.
1
R
In this paper, we show how existence of an equilibrium that is a point in Euclidean n space, can be represented as a set of fixed points of a sequence of mappings from the real line onto itself. So consider now the contraction mapping theorem for the case where For mappings, the natural norm to use is the absolute value,
= and the definition of a contraction mapping becomes as follows:
Definition 2:
If there exists (0,1)
In words, this says that the straight line between any two points on the graph of the function, must have a slope in the interval (-1,1). If, we don't require the convergence property, we only require that the slope be less than 1 and that the function be continuous. We will define such a function as a "quasi-contraction mapping".
Definition 3:
If there exists (0, 1) 
and if f is continuous on then f is a quasi-contraction mapping. , X This gives us the following variant of the contraction mapping theorem:
If is a closed, connected subset of and f is a quasi-contraction mapping, then there exists a unique fixed point,
Proof:
First we show that a fixed point must exist. For any we have
If is not bounded above, we have, from X (3) and (4), 
To show uniqueness, let * x ∈X be a fixed point of f. Then
Thus any fixed point of f must be the maximum fixed point, implying that only one can exist.
Q.E.D
Finally, if, in addition to the above assumptions, we assume that f is differentiable almost everywhere, then Condition (2) is equivalent to the following:
is continuous over , b) ( ) w h e r e i s d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .
Similarly, Condition (3) is equivalent to the following: a) is continuous over , b) ( ) w h e r e i s d i f f e r e n t i a b l e .
This gives a general uniqueness theorem that we shall use in this paper:
Theorem 3:
Let be a closed, connected subset of R , and let f be a continuous function from onto itself that is differentiable almost everywhere. Then if for some
there exists a unique fixed point * x ∈X such that ( *)
then the fixed point is stable in the sense that for any x ∈X and 1, n ≥ n ( ) * * . In the next section we describe the general class of games considered in this paper, and then, in Section 4, show how we can reduce the problem to one involving mappings and so invoke the notion of a quasi-contraction mapping to prove existence and uniqueness. We do not require that the i f be fully differentiable so that the model will be able to handle non-differentiabilities that can arise from boundary solutions to an individual player's optimisation problem. For ease of exposition, however, when presenting expressions involving derivatives we will omit the repeated caveat, "
", but this is implied.
n ∀ ∈ x X where is diffe iable i f rent Proofs of existence of an equilibrium in this class of games typically proceed by defining the aggregate best-response function, where :
so that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is a fixed point of f and vice versa, and then appealing to the Brouwer fixed-point theorem. We want to find sufficient conditions for f to have a unique fixed point. For this, it would be sufficient to show that f is a contraction mapping, but we would like a more general condition using the notion of a quasi-contraction mapping defined above.
An Alternative Approach.
To transform the problem, we define an equilibrium iteratively, starting with one or two players and then progressively adding more in. The procedure we follow here will derive a general fixed-point theorem for a function, where is a connected subset of the real line. Because we are interested in the gametheoretic application, however, we will continue to refer to the elements from the vector, x, as strategies, and to fixed points as "equilibria".
:
,
where That is, it is a set of strategies such that the first m players' strategies are the best response to the strategies of all other players, but the remaining n-m players' strategies are unconstrained. , then is single-valued and defined for all .
Our approach to finding sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium is to find the conditions for a unique 1-equilibrium that holds for all values of and then to extend that by induction by finding conditions for there to exist a unique (m+1)-equilibrium that holds for all values of
conditional on there being a unique m-equilibrium.
We will define a set of mappings, that will relate a player's strategy to itself. For m=1, we simply define,
There is an equivalence between a 1-equilibrium and a fixed point of From Theorem 2, a sufficient condition for there to exist a unique 1-equilibrium is that be a quasi-contraction mapping. When
f is a best-response function, and so this sufficient condition will always hold. In the more general case, we need
. In this case, define as Now imagine that there exists a unique (m-1)-equilibrium for each value of We say that f exhibits an "iterative quasi-contraction mapping" if exists and is a quasi-contraction mapping for each m g {2,..., }, m n ∈ and that it exhibits an "iterative contraction mapping" if exists and is a contraction mapping for each
The main result of this paper is then
Theorem 4:
If f exhibits an iterative quasi-contraction mapping, then f has a unique fixed point and hence the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof:
If 
Sufficient Conditions with Calculus.
The analysis of the previous section gives sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness that derive from our sequential approach. They are not, however, particularly user friendly. For that, we would like to express the conditions in terms of the slopes of the best-response functions.
To do this let be the nxn Jacobian matrix of f evaluated at x, with elements , so that ( 1 0 )
Proof:
Note that
so Equation (9) 
We can then rewrite Equation (11) then the best-response function exhibits an iterative contraction mapping.
Follows automatically from Theorems 3 and 4. Q.E.D.
Condition (14) gives the general existence and uniqueness condition of this paper-that the function f has a unique fixed point if the leading principal minors of ( ) ( ) n n − I x J x are positive for all x, and bounded away from zero.
Relationship to Other Existence and Uniqueness Conditions.
In this paper, we have found a condition under which there exists a unique fixed point for the single-valued function, where is a closed, :
, n f X X n X connected subset of the real line and f is continuous. Note that if X is bounded, the existence of a fixed point is guaranteed by the Brouwer fixed-point theorem and so Theorem 6 is primarily a uniqueness theorem. Typically, existence theorems for pure-strategy Nash equilibria that deal with more general games do require bounded strategy spaces. This includes games where the best-response correspondences are not necessarily single valued that make use of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, and the existence theorem for supermodular games in which the best-response functions are not necessarily continuous, which makes use of the Tarski fixed-point theorem. (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a description of supermodular games.)
The contraction mapping theorem is probably the most important general existence theorem for games with unbounded strategy spaces. Theorem 6 uses a weaker requirement than a full contraction mapping to establish both existence and uniqueness, and provides a simple Jacobian representation of that condition. Interestingly, this matrix representation of the condition is very similar to a number of existing uniqueness proofs that require a prior demonstration of existence. The major contribution of Theorem 6, therefore, is to extend those results to the case of unbounded strategy spaces.
In the remainder of this section, we survey those existing uniqueness conditions.
A. Univalent Mapping Theorems:
If the function for which a fixed-point constitutes an equilibrium is a univalent mapping, there can be at most a single fixed point. Gale and Nikaido (1965) is the classic statement of conditions for univalence, often used for showing uniqueness. This condition is very similar to Theorem 6. It requires that ( ) n n − I J x be a Pmatrix-that is, that all principal minors be positive. In situations where the strategy-space, is bounded, this requirement is sufficient to show uniqueness. Theorem 6 extends this application of the Gale-Nikaido condition to the case of unbounded strategy spaces by proving existence in those cases. Also, even for bounded strategy spaces, Theorem 6 is slightly more general, in that it only requires that the leading principal minors be positive. , X Interestingly, Gale and Nikaido make reference in their paper to a conjecture by Samuelson (1953) that univalence holds if the leading principal minors of the Jacobean matrix are positive. Although, as Gale and Nikaido show, this conjecture is not true in general, we have shown here that the less restrictive condition proposed by Samuleson, while not sufficient to show global univalence, is sufficient to demonstrate uniqueness.
A second classic paper using the univalent mapping approach to uniqueness is Rosen (1965) . Rosen considers a very general game structure in which the strategy space for any player can be conditional on the strategy chosen by another (as could happen in a coalition game). In the special case, however, where the player's strategy spaces are orthogonal to each other, i.e. the class of games considered in this paper, Rosen's sufficient condition can be written as follows:
If there exists a diagonal matrix R, with diagonal terms such that the symmetric matrix
0 ii r > ∀i ( ) ( )′ + RA RA is positive definite,
then there is a unique equilibrium.
The main result of this paper generalises this result in two ways: First, Rosen establishes existence by means of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, and thus again requires that each player's strategy space be bounded; second, Rosen's sufficient condition is strictly encompassed by the conditions of Theorem 6 here, as shown by the following result.
Theorem 7:
For any symmetric nxn matrix, A, if there exists a diagonal matrix R, with diagonal terms such that the symmetric matrix ( ) 0 ii r > ∀i ( )′ + RA RA is positive definite, then the leading principal minors of A will be positive, but the reverse is not necessarily true.
Proof:
RA is positive definite if and only if is positive definite, which implies that the principal minors of are all positive, and hence that the principal minors of A are positive. The fact that a non-symmetric matrix with positive principal minors is not necessarily positive definite, however, allows one to construct counterexamples in which the conditions for Theorem 6 are met, but not for Rosen's theorem. For one such counterexample, consider the following matrix: B. Index Theory. Simsek, et al. (2007) present an extension of the Poincaré-Hopf index theorem, which includes a uniqueness condition for continuous games as one of its applications. Their condition, which is also an extension of the Gale and Nikaido (1965) result discussed above, is implied by ( ) n n − I J x being a P-matrix, but is slightly more general. As with the Gale and Nikaido and Rosen results, however, the Simsek et al. result demonstrates uniqueness within a bounded region and so, again, Theorem 6 provides an extension of the result into the case of unbounded strategy spaces. On the other hand, the Simsek, et al. condition only needs to apply locally at the equilibrium and not globally, and so it is not fully encompassed by Theorem 6.
C. Cournot Games.
There are many papers giving conditions for uniqueness in a Cournot quantitysetting game. These include Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) , Gaudet and Salant (1991) , Long and Soubeyran (2000) , and Kolstad and Matheisen (1987) . Kolstad and Matheisen provide a general necessary and sufficient condition derived from index theory, but, as Gaudet and Salant point out, their condition requires the absence of degenerate equilibria, a condition that in some contexts can be quite restrictive. The other three of these papers provide conditions which imply that the best-response functions of players are negatively sloped, as well as conditions requiring differentiability everywhere. As shown by the following theorem, using our approach we can generalise the conditions on best-response functions as well, as well as being able to accommodate points of nondifferentiability, such as at the minimum price for which demand is zero.
Theorem 8:
Let n A be a square matrix with 1 ii a i = ∀ and, for some k,
Proof:
Given in the Appendix.
The conditions of Theorem 8 describe the matrix n A arising from a Cournot game in which the reaction firms all have a slope in excess of -1, and at most one firm has an upward-sloping reaction function. The generalisation to allow one upward-sloping reaction function may seem trivial, but consider a Cournot game with constant elasticity demand, ,
and constant marginal costs of production. These functional forms are not idiosyncratic, but this game does not satisfy the condition that best-response functions are downward sloping. It is trivial, however, to show that for elastic demand (i.e. for 1)
ε < it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 8.
D. Row-Sum Conditions:
Cachon and Netessine (2004) show that a sufficient condition for the function f to exhibit a contraction mapping is that, for all x,
That is, f exhibits a contraction mapping if the sum of the absolute values of the off-diagonal elements in the Jacobian matrix is bounded below 1 in each row or in each column. This result is established by showing that a function exhibits a contraction mapping if the largest eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix, is less than 1, and that, using a result of Horn and Johnson (1996) , this will hold if the maximum row sum or the maximum column sum is less than 1. Although this approach is very different from ours, it is easy to show that this condition meets our requirement for there to be an iterative quasi-contraction mapping. Indeed, we can generalise the result a bit:
Theorem 9:
Let n A be a square matrix with If 0 . 
In the case where f describes reaction functions so that ( ) / 0, , ,
it is easy to show that the conditions for the Cachon and Netessine result imply that n A is dominant diagonal with 1 .
then generalises the contraction-mapping-derived existence and uniqueness conditions in two ways.
First, the theorem allows the rows or columns to be scaled by non-unitary The first example in Section 7 illustrates a simple game where this scaling property is used to prove existence in a game with unbounded strategy spaces.
Second, in the general case where it is not necessarily the case that one can generate examples with ( ) / 0,
is dominant diagonal but the maximum row sum and maximum column sum of exceed 1. ( ) 
Two Examples.
This section contains two worked examples of games where the generalisation of existing conditions provided by Theorem 6 is useful for showing existence and uniqueness. The first example is a game with unbounded strategy space but for which the matrix norm condition does not apply; the second example is a bounded game where the generalisation of the P-matrix condition is used.
Example 1: An Externality Game with Stone-Geary Payoff Functions.
Consider a model with n consumers indexed by i, each of whom derives utility from some public amenity, of which Y units are available for consumption. In particular, let the monetary value to consumer i of each unit of the amenity be . , for any .
Accordingly, the strategy space for this game is not bounded. The slopes of the reaction functions are given by
In the notation of the paper, then, we have 1
can take arbitrarily high values over the strategy space, the maximum row-or-column-sum condition on of Horn and Johnson described in Section 6D above does not apply. It is easy to show, however, that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9. Example 2: An Advertising Game.
Consider a two-stage game in which in stage 1 firms simultaneously choose a price for their product, and in stage 2 they simultaneously choose a level of advertising. This example will consider the uniqueness of the stage-2 subgame.
Let there be three firms indexed by i, i=1,…,3, and let i x be the quantity of advertising chosen by firm i. Let the demand for each firm be
ω is firm i's market share and Q is the total demand.
The point of this example is to illustrate the generalisation of the P-matrix condition when the game is asymmetric. Let firms 2 and 3 be dominant, established players in this market, and let firm 1 be a new entrant. Accordingly, we assume that firm 1's advertising only affects the market share and not total demand; similarly, the advertising of the other two firms affects the total demand but not market shares. Specifically, assume As with Example 1, we use the CobbDouglas form to create a numerically simple example, and the Stone-Geary displacement simply to eliminate the degenerate case in which the marginal product of advertising for one firm is zero if the advertising of the other firm is zero. We allow the possibility of increasing returns to scale in Q, but to capture the idea that diminishing returns must set in eventually, we allow there to be an upper bound on the level of advertising of each firm of . (1
As shown by the relative simplicity of the proofs of Theorems 8 and 9, the general condition-that the leading principal minors of the matrix ( ) n n − I J x all be positive-lends itself to reasonably simple induction proofs for demonstrating that the condition holds in particular models. The result therefore has the potential to serve as a source for further existence and uniqueness conditions in specific games.
Appendix
A. Proof of Theorem 8.
For ease of exposition, it will be convenient to prove a trivially generalised statement of Theorem 8 in which the diagonal elements of n A can take any positive values and there can be a single row in which the common-off-diagonal elements take the same value as the diagonal element. We also, without loss of generality, let the row where the off-diagonal elements can be negative be row 1:
Theorem 8a:
Let be the set of nxn matrices, n Ω , n A satisfying the following properties:
Proof:
The proof is by induction. The proposition is clearly true for n=1 and n=2. Now assume that there is some 2 n > such that the proposition holds for all . n n < We will show that it then holds for . n n = The proof follows by considering the matrix derived from n A by replacing the diagonal terms in one row with the off-diagonal term for that row. We show that this change unambiguously reduces the determinant of the matrix, but results in a matrix with a non-negative determinant.
Formally, define the matrix which is derived from some nxn 
B. Proof of Theorem 9.
Theorem 4.C.1 in Takayama (1985) , shows that a dominant diagonal matrix with no constraint on the sign of the diagonal elements must be non-singular. It is then straightforward to show that if the diagonal elements are all positive, the determinant must be positive. The proof is by induction. Trivially, the 1x1 matrix whose single element is positive has a positive determinant. Now assume that the theorem holds for all matrices of size m-1, and let m A be a dominant diagonal matrix. This implies that 
